A Loss of Control: Privilege Cases Diminish Presidential Power by Devins, Neal
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media Faculty and Deans
1998
A Loss of Control: Privilege Cases Diminish
Presidential Power
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu
Copyright c 1998 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media
Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "A Loss of Control: Privilege Cases Diminish Presidential Power" (1998). Popular Media. Paper 44.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/44
- TRENDS IN THE LAW 
A Loss ol Control 
Privilege cases diminish presidential power 
BY NEAL DEVINS 
When the dust of the 
Monica Lewinsky inves-
tigation settles, the law 
of privilege will be better 
developed, but the ques-
tion of who speaks for the 
government in court will 
remain unanswered. 
The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit sided with indepen-
dent counsel Kenneth 
Starr in two recent de-
cisions, rejecting privi-
lege claims of Secret Ser-
vice officers and deputy 
White House counsel 
Bruce Lindsey. 
Starr had . sought 
their testimony in his 
investigation of possible 
peijury and obstruction 
of justice by President 
Clinton in connection with 
Paula Jones' sexual ha-
nissment lawsuit. 
Losses on Two Fronts 
The president came 
out the loser for two rea-
sons. First, the decisions 
will bar the White House 
from claiming certain 
types of privilege in any 
subsequent independent 
counsel probes and, pos-
sibly, in congressional in-
vestigations. 
"the United States act-
ing through the Attorney 
General" filed a brief ar-
guing that such a privi-
lege exists. 
For its part, the 
White House distanced 
itself from the dispute, 
claiming that the attor-
ney general was acting on 
her own when she decid-
ed to file the brief and 
then to appeal her defeat. 
The dispute between 
Reno and Starr was un-
avoidable. After President 
Nixon ordered the firing 
of Archibald Cox, a Wa-
tergate special prosecu-
tor in the Justice Depart-
ment, Congress created 
an independent coun-
sel who could not be 
sacked by the presi-
dent nor disciplined by 
the attorney general. 
Thus, there was lit-
tle Reno could do to stop 
Starr from making ar-
guments she considered 
wrongheaded. Her choices 
were to make her case in 
court or stand by the side-
lines. 
But for Judge Lau-
rence Silberman of the 
D.C. Circuit, the Justice 
brief should have been 
tossed out because "[ w ]e 
cannot have two opposing 
lawyers before us repre-Second, the executive 
branch infighting weak-
ened the presidency and, 
in so doing, transferred 
power to the courts. 
BRUCE LINDSEY (left), White House deputy counsel,.was barred 
from invoking attorney-client privilege in grand jury proceedings. 
senting the same named 
party." 
His colleagues, how-
By refusing to embrace Justice 
Department arguments in these 
cases, the White House made it dif-
ficult for unelected federal judges to 
sort out the preferences of the ex-
ecutive branch. This disagreement 
Neal Devins is the Goodrich 
Professor of Law at the College of 
William and Mary School of Law in 
Williamsburg, Va. He was a consul-
tant to the U.S. Postal Service in its 
dispute with the Postal Commission 
and President Bush. 
26 ABA JOURNAL/ OCTOBER 1 998 
signaled the courts that Lewinsky-
related privilege claims were, at 
best, speculative and contributed to 
the White House legal defeats. 
In the Secret Service dispute, 
Starr and Attorney General Janet 
Reno differed over whether agents 
who protect Clinton can be forced 
to testify about his relationship 
with Lewinsky. Representing the 
"United States," Starr argued there 
is no authority to support a protec-
tive function privilege for Secret 
Service agents. In sharp contrast, 
ever, allowed Reno to 
make her argument before ruling 
in favor of Starr in In re Sealed 
Case, No. 98-3069 (July 7). 
A Three-for-All 
Three parts of government 
tangled in another Lewinsky-relat-
ed matter, namely, the grand jury 
testimony of deputy White House 
counsel Lindsey. The dispute was 
between the White House, Justice 
and, of course, the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel. 
Starr argued that government 
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lawyers can never invoke attorney-
client privilege in criminal matters. 
The White House maintained that 
the president has an absolute priv-
ilege over all conversations with 
government lawyers. 
Said the Justice Department, 
which filed an amicus curiae brief, 
courts ought to weigh the needs of 
a thorough investigation against 
the president's interest in candid 
confidential advice. 
The competing filings of the 
White House and Justice Depart-
ment may seem convenient when 
different parts of the administra-
tion cannot agree on what the .law 
is or should be. But if Justice is not 
finally accountable to the president 
for the positions it takes, to whom 
is it accountable? 
And if Justice is not account-
able to the president, then 
seems to follow that the 
dent is not responsible for 
Justice says. 
Furthermore, how can 
al judges take seriously the 
of the United States when the 
White House and Justice 
present conflicting argu-
ments? 
In this case, the 
D.C. Circuit reject-
ed both the White 
House and Justice 
Department and 
again sided with 
Starr. 
It con<clud:ectj 
in In re ~···~"'~J, 
No. 98-3060 (J 
ly 27), that a 
government 
lawyer may 
invoke the 
torney-client 
privilege in 
any federal 
grand jury 
investigation. 
In support 
of its holding, 
the court cited 
the public 
est in honest 
ernment and in 
exposing wrong 
doing by govern-
ment officials. 
Even if the White 
House and Justice were in 
sync in the Lindsey case, 
the Office of Independent 
Counsel would still be making 
arguments antagonistic to the 
executive branch. When Con-
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gress grants litigation authority to 
officials whom the president cannot 
dismiss, such as independent coun-
sel or heads of independent agen-
cies, the inevitable by-product is di-
minished presidential authority 
over legal policy-making. 
Clinton's predecessor, George 
Bush, learned this the hard way. 
In a dispute between the U.S. 
Postal Service and the Postal Rate 
Commission, the Bush Justice De-
partment argued that it, not judges, 
should broker intragovernmental 
disputes. But the Postal Service's 
board of governors resisted, argu-
ing that it had independent liti-
gation authority. 
Following this 
rebuff, Bush 
himself de-
manded that 
the Postal 
Service withe 
draw from 
the case 
and threat-
ened to re-
move the 
board if his 
MONICA 
lfWINSKY 
fueled disputes 
between the 
White House, 
Justice and 
Ken Starr. 
order was not followed. 
In the end, however, the em-
peror was found to have no clothes. 
The board sought and obtained a 
preliminary injunction against the 
president, blocking its threatened 
removal. 
The lesson is that the admin-
istrative state is-surprise-some-
what rigged against a strong presi-
dency. Independent agencies, inde-
pendent counsel and the like are 
supposed to disagree with the pres-
ident-not all of the time, of course, 
but definitely some of the time. 
That is why the president cannot 
remove independent agency heads. 
But presidents can ensure that 
the executive branch speaks with 
a single voice in court. The Reagan 
White House, for example, persuad-
ed Clarence Thomas, who was then 
chair of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, to with-
draw a brief supporting race-con-
scious affirmative action. 
In sharp contrast, in Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Rea-
gan administration shot itself in 
the foot. After suffering great em-
barrassment for its decision to re-
verse longstanding IRS policy and 
grant tax breaks to racist schools, 
the administration asked the Su-
preme Court to appoint a "counsel 
adversary" to defend the govern-
ment's earlier position. 
At the same time, the admin-
istration filed a competing brief 
defending its policy reversal. To 
no one's surprise, the Court em-
braced the counsel adversary's ar-
guments. 
Advice for a Strong Presidency 
Like the Reagan administra-
tion in Bob Jones, the Clinton ad-
ministration has done itself great 
damage in the Lindsey lawsuit. 
By allowing the Justice De-
partment and White House to butt 
heads with each other, the Clinton 
administration has relieved the 
courts of any pressure to defer to 
the executive branch. 
When the people elected Bill 
Clinton, it was to head the United 
States of America, not some office 
in the executive branch known as 
the White House. 
While statutes like the one cre-
ating the independent counsel may 
create the situation that the presi-
dent now confronts, it is neverthe-
less true that the buck must stop 
somewhere. In the Lindsey case, it 
must stop at the Oval Office. • 
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